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Introduction 
As in many other European and non-European countries, an explicit 
parenting support policy made its way onto the French political agenda 
during the early 1990s: a ‘turn to parenting’ complete with its trail of new 
terms, instruments and institutions. In France, some decision-makers now 
consider this parenting support policy (politique de soutien à la 
parentalité) as a new, but still financially marginal, ‘pillar of French family 
policy’. It responds to a growing political demand for a solution capable of 
guaranteeing the success of the parental educational mission, or at the 
very least of helping avoid its failure, as well as the consequences of such 
a failure for the entire community.  
One may well wonder, however, whether this policy represents a real 
innovation or merely the revival of a longstanding tradition of ‘policing 
families’. In spite of this well-known tradition that first emerged in the 18th 
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century, which has been thoroughly documented by historians, many 
international experts argue that we are at a turning point (Daly, 2013a) 
and engaging in a new ‘parenting culture’, combining moral panic with 
acute risk consciousness (Furedi, 2008; Lee and al., 2014). One of the 
main issues is thus the question of change. What’s new under the 
spotlight?  
In this paper, we analyse the French case, in a bid to clarify this question. 
We argue that the slow policy process that led to current French parenting 
support policy is at once the consequence of a political desire to structure 
and manage a myriad of grassroots initiatives, and the outcome of an 
ideological battle (Martin, 2014). This battle brings into conflict 
fundamental alternatives pitting universalism against targeting, parental 
empowering against parental control, offering support to parents via 
services versus re-educating them through advice and behavioural 
training, and local and community actions versus national regulatory 
actions. A fiercely-fought battle of ideas around the parenting issue is 
taking place behind the scenes, mixing old and new ideas, reactivating 
norms and stereotypes that are deeply rooted in our social history 
concerning the private and public spheres respectively as well as the 
respective roles of mothers, fathers and public institutions.  
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While mapping the field of positions and presenting the arguments of a 
selection of actors of this policy framing in the French context 1, we stress 
the reactivation of old and deep-rooted oppositions and controversies 
between left- and right- wing parties as well as between republican and 
Catholic milieux, concerning family, private life issues and the challenge of 
secularization.  
Although parenting support does indeed concern many European and non-
European countries, following a mainstream of ideas, instruments and 
issues, we argue that the French configuration has certain specificities 
that need to be addressed, not only in order to estimate the 
commonalities but also to avoid making hasty generalisations. Our paper 
is organised in three steps: first, consideration of the hypothesis of an 
international turn to parenting; second, a presentation of the policy 
process and arguments in the French configuration; third, a return to a 
very longstanding tradition of policing family and, finally a conclusion on 
our main question: “What really is new?” 
An international turn to parenting  
According to the analysis of the past 25 years, it seems clear that 
parenting is becoming a new issue at international level, as well as one 
that is commonly admitted to. The first common indicator of a change is 
                                                          
1 This paper is based on a collective research project funded by four national research agencies (France, 
England, Germany and the Netherlands): the PolChi research (see http://www.uni-
goettingen.de/en/213091.html ). In France our material is based on a systematic analysis of official reports at 
national and international level, as well as interviews with 20 experts and high-ranking civil servants involved in 
this policy domain in France and 20 professionals in charge of implementing the policy at local level. See the 
report Martin et al. 2014. 
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certainly the adoption and spread of new terms. This is currently the case 
in English, with the verb “parent” and noun “parenting”, as well as in 
French with the noun “parentalité” (and “parentage” in Québécois). These 
terms are not substitutes for previous and well-established others such as 
family, parenthood or kinship. Indeed, the emergence of these neologisms 
in the two languages is relatively recent and has been gradually 
integrated, over the past two decades or so, to the lexicon of public 
decision-makers, politicians, media and professionals working in the field 
of childhood and the family, as well as the health education and disease 
prevention sector.  
Ellie Lee underlines this popularity in the introduction to the book she co-
edited on Parenting Culture Studies and indicates that the number of 
books about parenting more than doubled between 1980 and 2000 (Lee et 
al., 2014, p. 5). To give another example of this success, a basic 
consultation of the SAGE documentary, using parenting as keyword 
provides access to almost 21,000 published articles, 15,600 of which 
(almost 75%) have been published since January 2000, mainly in the 
following disciplinary fields: Psychology, Public Health, Sociology, Youth 
Studies and Behavioural Sciences2. Last but not least, in the French 
                                                          
2
 . The popularity of this keyword is such that a new journal entitled Parenting, Science and Practice was 
created in 2001, defining its field as: “Parenting: Science and Practice strives to promote the exchange of 
empirical findings, theoretical perspectives, and methodological approaches from all disciplines that help to 
define and advance theory, research, and practice in parenting, caregiving, and childrearing broadly 
construed... The journal brings parenting to science and science to parenting”, see 
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?show=aimsScope&journalCode=hpar20 
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context, we can mention the explosion of the word match frequency of the 
term parentalité in the media, as noted by Julien Damon (see figure 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Occurences of the term “parentalité” in AFP (Agence France Presse) publications 
 
Source: AFP cited in Damon, 2012, p. 167.  
 
Although the French expression parentalité at once integrates the 
meanings of both parenthood and parenting (leading to a certain amount 
of misunderstanding), both neologisms - parenting and parentalité -
indicate a new focus on the role of parents, regardless of gender: mothers 
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and fathers. For Mary Daly (2013b), the apparent gender neutrality of the 
term 'parent' with regard to the respective roles of mother and father, is 
not so much a proactive strategy in defence of the idea that the parental 
role is (or should be) less and less gendered (more gender neutral), as a 
way of denying this gender issue in parenting matters (gender blindness). 
Other experts argue that this ‘neutral’ term could also refer to the 
extension to fathers of the normative messages and prescriptions 
traditionally addressed to mothers alone.  
Be that as it may, as Ellie Lee argues: “the message to mothers (and also 
fathers) is that the health, welfare and success (or lack of it) of their 
children can be directly attributed to the decisions they make about 
matters like feeding their children; ‘parenting’, parents are told, is both 
the hardest and most important job in the world. Tomorrow depends on it” 
(Lee et al., 2014:2). 
Without returning to the emergence and roots of these notions of 
parenting and parentalité themselves, and their anchorage in various 
theoretical and disciplinary backgrounds (see Martin 2012a), we might 
note that these terms aim to focus on parent and on parental practices 
and their impact on children. As New Labour aptly formulated it, parenting 
is "what parents do rather than what they are" (cited by Lewis, 2012, p. 
102). One could add: “what they should do”. The nature of parenting 
support is thus to ‘support’ and ’educate’ parents in their child-rearing 
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role” (Daly & Bray, 2015: 634) - to socialise these primary actors of 
socialisation.  
Out of the debates and institutional reforms concerning childhood and 
private issues over recent decades, a second argument aimed at 
identifying change has emerged: a new backdrop. One crucial impetus 
that must be mentioned is the 1989 signature of the international 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) - in other words the 
recognition that children have specific interests that must be guaranteed. 
Another contextual element is the impact of the Dutroux affair on public 
opinion in 1996. Many other family tragedies have occurred since then, 
demonstrating the need to protect children from potential harm from 
parents (and other adults). Since the beginning of the 1990s, the general 
issue of a ‘risk society’ has developed dramatically. This also affects family 
and private life, particularly when youth delinquency is presented as a 
result of parenting (ir)responsibility. Although these issues are highly 
controversial among experts and political actors, they impose a double-
edged risk in case of failure of the parent-child relationship: the child is 
either a victim or a threat, as he or she grows older, yet the parent is 
always to blame.  
A third level of change refers to family policy reforms in different 
countries3 - and more precisely the development of a parenting support 
                                                          
3
 . For a development of these national cases, see the special issue “Parenting support in European countries” 
edited by Mary Daly in the Social Policy and Society, vol 14, (4), 2015. See also Boddy et al.  (2009); Richter et 
al. (2012); Ramaekers & Suissa (2012). 
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policy as such. As Daly and Bray (2015) argue, parenting support seems 
better established in England than in many other European countries, 
following a turning point initiated by New Labour between 1997 and 2010. 
Jane Lewis (2011) has undertaken a detailed analysis of this process. 
Over time, this parenting policy has shifted away from mainly targeting 
those parents whose children and adolescents present anti-social 
behaviour problems, towards a territorially-organized universal policy. A 
'commissioner' is charged with its local implementation, combined with 
recourse to evidence-based programmes. Despite the limitations of this 
investment, which presupposed recourse to costly, commodified 
programmes (for the training of contributors), this policy was continued 
by the coalition government which succeeded New Labour in 2010 - even 
though this government was extremely concerned with reducing public 
spending. According to Mary Daly and Rachel Bray, the nature of the 
Labour government’s concern about poverty and inequality among 
children as well as the availability of a number of evidence-based 
programmes and a fascination at the time with their supposed efficacy 
explain why parenting support grew so quickly in England (Daly & Bray, 
2015). 
An analogous trend is readable in other countries. For example, starting 
from the longstanding experience of public child healthcare centres, 
mainly oriented towards public health and prevention issues (vaccinations, 
weight monitoring, physical development as well as motor and language 
skills), the Netherlands turned, with the new Youth Act in 2005, towards 
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the prevention of negative childrearing practices with increasingly 
systematic recourse to evidence-based programmes for parents, 
demonstrating this strong concern for proof and validation (particularly at 
the Dutch Centres for Youth and Family; 2008-2011). This change went 
hand in hand with a coming together of policy on youth and the family 
(Knijn & Hopman, 2015). The process was slower in Germany, where it 
was not until 2010-2011 that family policy turned to this type of 
programme, mainly by pursuing a similar, public health approach via a 
return to old interventions such as Familienhebehammen (midwives) 
(Ostner & Stolberg, 2015). This primacy of public health is also discernible 
in choices made in Sweden from 2009-2010, with the same recourse to 
standardized programmes - even though enthusiasm for it has waned 
somewhat in this country in recent years (Lundqvist, 2015).  
In this process of defining national parenting support policies, it is 
important to add the incentive role played by European institutions. Even 
though these policies are a matter for individual member states, it is 
undeniable that the EU has facilitated the circulation of ideas and 
methods, thus contributing to the definition of orientations and suggesting 
best practices. Three publications can be mentioned on this issue in the 
course of the 2000s. First, the publication by a committee of experts on 
childhood and the family, under the auspices of the Council of Europe in 
2006, entitled: 'Parenting in contemporary Europe: a positive approach' 
(Daly, 2007). With its recommendation prioritising positive parenting, the 
Council of Europe opened a new chapter - that is, "parental behaviour 
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guaranteeing that the interests of the child will be fulfilled" which, for the 
first time, unambiguously prioritized the relationship between parents and 
children as an object of intervention.  
The 2007 report of the European Network of National Observatories on 
Childhood (ChildOn, 2007), entitled Survey on the Role of Parents and the 
Support from the Governments in the EU in 2007 followed the same 
orientation, promoting socio-educational parent support, in the form of 
advice and counselling services. In 2012, a report ordered by the 
European Commission from RAND Europe4, entitled Parenting Support 
Policy Brief (European Commission, 2012), finally offered a general 
synthesis on the issue by placing it within its historical context and 
defining its principles and philosophy, prior to describing national 
experiences that highlight best practices. The RAND report also argues for 
the necessary shift towards a Social Investment State, with explicit 
references to the works of Anthony Giddens, Gösta Esping-Andersen and 
James Heckman, who was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics 
(2000) for his idea of 'capitalizing later in life' thanks to an investment in 
early childhood to avoid future expenditure (European Commission, 2012, 
p. 7 and following).  
                                                          
4
 . An international think-tank of experts, founded in California in 1945, and issuing opinions on a great many 
research and development questions. 
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The French turn to parenting  
The policy that took shape in France during the 1990s seems to have 
taken a similar – yet original – trajectory (Hamel et al., 2012; Martin, 
2014 and 2015). As in other European countries, it mixes a variety of 
logics and objectives, blending new types of intervention, professionals 
and techniques with pre-existing ones. It also combines local initiatives on 
the ground with new official national institutions to supervise and regulate 
them. Overall, this policy framing mainly appears to be a recognition by 
public authorities, in the late 1990s, of a myriad of practical grassroots 
initiatives at local level and ultimately (and this seems to be a formal 
turning point) the creation of a new national institution: the Comité 
national de soutien à la parentalité (National parenting support 
committee). Created in 2010, this committee is currently the official 
governance body for parenting policy as such in France.  
Initiatives aimed at supporting families in their educational role already 
have a long history in France. Our interviewees in the PolChi project have 
identified some key moments in this framing. Though not going as far 
back as  the creation of the école des parents in 1930, one of the experts 
we interviewed for the Polchi research presented the beginning as follows: 
« Concerning the key dates, it is important to go back to the free 
nursery at the Sorbonne University in 1968 – it was in a way the 
first parental nursery, and one of the first initiatives to accompany 
the family transformations of the 1970s. It arose out of civil society 
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- not even from the associative network. For me, the first movement 
to support parentalité, the first parenting support, came from civil 
society and non-governmental organizations. Next, we had the 
beginnings of the Maison Verte initiated by Françoise Dolto in 1979, 
ie  new childcare places to welcome both children and parents 
together, as well as the introduction of family mediation at the 
beginning of the 1980s, imported from North America…  All these 
initiatives came from civil society and were recognized by public 
authorities as being promising”. (Expert on family, childhood and 
parenting issues, Polchi interview) 
Another interviewee, this time in charge of parenting support policy at the 
CNAF (Caisse Nationale des Allocations Familiales), which is the main 
social security institution in charge of family policy in France, distinguishes 
four key moments and sequences in the definition of this new policy. From 
her point of view, the first step was taken at the end of the 1990s, with 
the creation of the REAAP network (Réseau d’Écoute, d’Accueil et 
d’Accompagnement des Parents), to coordinate and organize a myriad of 
local initiatives by associations and non-governmental organisations.  
“1998/1999 was really the first step, with the role of the Child and 
Family Institute5 and the creation of the REAAP. At the beginning, 
the main idea was to support the initiatives that were emerging at 
                                                          
5
 . This Institute (Institut de l’Enfance et de la Famille) was created in 1984 and then merged in 1997 with the 
Centre international de l’Enfance created in 1947 to become the Centre International de l’enfance et de la 
famille.  
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the time in various associations and localities, and to coordinate 
them via a network. The state sought to federate these initiatives 
and answer the associations’ demand for better recognition. The 
Délégation interministérielle à la famille was in charge of the 
coordination. (Responsable pôle jeunesse et parentalité, CNAF)”.   
For this actor, four other key steps remain legible. A second step was 
taken with the creation of another coordination body concerning family 
mediation: the Conseil national consultatif de la médiation familiale which 
facilitated the creation of a national degree in 2003 (diplôme d’Etat de 
médiateur familial), a process of training centre accreditation - and 
ultimately a service delivery funded by the CNAF. The objective was 
clearly to organize the offer of this service across the national territory. 
Our interviewee also identified a third step in the wake of an official (and 
fairly critical) report by the Cour des Comptes in 2009 (Cour des Comptes, 
2009) on the relatively low efficacy of this emerging parenting policy. The 
CNAF thus decided to vote on a new Convention d’Objectif et de Gestion 
(planning and management agreement) for the 2009-2012 period, to once 
again reinforce and improve how the sector operated, though the funding 
level remained relatively low (a 40% increase, from 53 to 75 million euros 
per year). The fourth step, according to this high-ranking civil servant, 
was the creation of the new national body called Conseil National de 
Soutien à la Parentalité. 
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“This really was a structuring phase, bringing points of view 
together, working on the definition of parentalité and the types of 
intervention included in parenting support” (Responsable pôle 
jeunesse et parentalité, CNAF). 
For this interviewee, the fifth step is the publication of another official 
report, this time by the Inspection Générale des Affaires Sociales (IGAS) 
recommending another strong impulsion in favour of this parenting 
support policy - and, in particular, the doubling of CNAF funding, which 
has indeed been implemented (the budget rose from €75 million to €150 
million) (Jacquey-Vazquez et al., 2013).  
The general trend is thus a progressive structuring, recognition and 
reinforcement of this policy. Yet it remains a relatively modest investment, 
accounting for just 0.2% of the overall budget devoted to family policy 
and allowances (exclusive of housing). Moreover, of the €150 million per 
year, central government invests just €18 million; local authorities 
contribute some €50 million and the social security system (the CNAF) 
provides the remainder. Although the state remains a relatively weak 
partner in financial terms, in comparison to the CNAF, its plays a crucial 
role in terms of governance and incentives towards local and national 
stakeholders.  
Nevertheless, this role of the state as guide and catalyst is not as 
unambiguous as it appears to be. The political agenda and political 
changes play a crucial role in renewing the arguments and priorities, the 
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discourse around this parenting issue and the measures to be favoured. 
From this perspective, important gaps separate the discourse and 
priorities of Ségolène Royal (socialist minister in charge of the family 
between 2000 and 2002) from those of the new right-wing minister in 
charge Christian Jacob (between 2002 and 2004), as well as from the 
arguments of Nadine Morano (another right-wing minister between 2008 
and 2010) and Dominique Bertinotti (socialist minister in charge of the 
Family between 2012 and 2014).  
The moralizing, punitive and security-related discourse and orientation 
that dominated the 2002 Presidential campaign on the right-wing is a 
good example of the ideological fight that took place prior to the right-
wing government’s come-back. The issue of insecurity - and juvenile 
delinquency in particular - became absolutely central. In the report I 
submitted to the Haut conseil de la population et de la famille in 2003 on 
Parentalité (Martin, 2003), I mapped this slide towards a security-focused 
political landscape. This ideological turn provoked a certain number of 
responses - such as the 2006 publication of a decree introducing a 
‘parental responsibility contract’ in the event of problems being caused by 
a pupil at school or significant absence from school; the establishment of 
‘parental responsibility courses’ and, in 2007, the creation of the Conseil 
pour les droits et devoirs des familles (Council for the rights and 
responsibilities of families) within municipal councils, and the publication 
of a decree in January 2011 introducing the suspension (or even 
cancellation) of family allowances for parents of children repeatedly 
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absent from school (at least 4 half days per month), or whose absence 
was unjustified (Martin, 2013). 
With the political turn and the return of a socialist presidency and 
government in 2012, this structural opposition was revived. As the 
Minister for the Family (between May 2012 and March 2014) argued in one 
of our interviews: 
“For the previous (right-wing) government, parenting policy was 
geared towards the stigmatization of families. To put it somewhat 
crudely, this was because the parents were not good parents and so, 
the sanctions road was the preferred option – we even went as far 
as the notorious 'décret Ciotti' – which advocated the withdrawal of 
family benefit payments where children's school attendance was 
poor. When I arrived, I considered that we had to turn this 
problematic on its head, by saying: it is not up to us to stigmatize 
families but rather, on the contrary, to admit that at some point, in 
the process of educating their children, they may come up against 
questions, difficulties, and problems – and the issue is to discover 
how we – that is, we the state, we the institutions, we the local 
authorities – might try to offer responses." (Minister in Charge of the 
Family, PolChi interview) 
These eruptions of political debate into the definition of parenting support 
policy clearly have multiple consequences, affecting how measures are 
defined and implemented, as well as how family and childhood 
17 
 
professionals are expected - or intended - to carry out their roles. Gérard 
Neyrand places considerable emphasis on this opposition between two 
models: support and control:  
“By focusing on the relationship to the child, the social management 
of the family ends up being caught between two competing logics of 
intervention, in which the desire to support parents is set against 
the desire to control them. On the one hand there is the idea of joint 
responsibility for bringing up children and its watchwords of 
participation, working together, targeted prevention...; and on the 
other the denunciation of parental abdication of responsibility, 
parenting courses, and the idea of getting back on the straight and 
narrow, and of systematic prevention...” (Neyrand, 2011: 11).  
On this particular issue, the French national configuration clearly joins the 
UK at the same period, in its sense of punitive accountability of parents 
who are incompetent and therefore guilty of their offspring's poor 
behaviour (the parenting contracts of 2005 in England and the 2006 
contrats de responsabilité parentale in France; for more details see Martin, 
2003).  
Yet in comparison with England, one major difference persists: in France, 
there has been very little recourse to the evidence-based programmes 
that were in force in England and some other countries, mainly due to 
resistance to this behavioural orientation among childhood and family 
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professionals. In the professionals’ discourse, the universal objective is a 
priority over targeting and formulating prescriptions. 
“Nobody wonders whether these parents are at Triple P level 3 or 5. 
To me, that’s just crazy … “ (Family Mediator, PolChi interview).  
“The evidence-based programmes in France - people will not stand 
for it. At REAAP or CAF level, it would not be accepted. It goes 
against our approach to  parents. We are not here to say: ‘you 
should do this or that… (…) We are not experts… This type of expert 
who gives orders does exist, but it’s neither our position nor our 
role.” (Professional in charge of a REAAP in a Caisse d’allocations 
familiales, PolChi interview). 
One of the best example of this resistance is the strong professional 
mobilization against the publication of an Inserm summary report 
(Inserm, 2005) on the knowledge acquired on early childhood troubles 
and their links to high-risk behaviours at adolescence. This report, which 
offered to survey the results and evidence from international research, 
argues that a link has been established between the behaviour of under-
3s or under-5s, and future risks. This evidence was however immediately 
strongly rejected by many professionals and experts (psychoanalysts, 
paediatricians, psychiatrists, neuropsychiatrists, psychologists, etc.) 
arguing that such types of knowledge were just giving rise to carriers of 
deviance. This movement (collectif ‘Pas de zéro de conduite pour les 
enfants de trois ans’) argued, in a petition: “By medicalizing to the 
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extreme phenomena of educational, psychological or social order, the 
INSERM expertise maintains confusion between social malaise and mental 
suffering, or even hereditary illness” 6. In spite of this resistance, 
implementation of evidence-based programmes is also emerging in France 
via public health and health education channels, but it remains highly 
controversial. 
Policing families: a longstanding tradition 
To what extent might we really consider this French turn to parenting 
since the mid-nineties to be a new phenomenon? In order to identify any 
change in recent developments, it is important to bear in mind one 
longstanding tradition in analysis: what Jacques Donzelot called La police 
des familles, ‘policing family’. Beyond the legal issue and the significance 
of the laws governing and framing the family, the challenge is clearly 
normative in the sense used by Michel Foucault in his analysis of 
biopower7: "moving from a simple opposition between ‘obedience’ and 
‘disobedience’ to a game of ‘distributions’ around a norm"… and "shifting 
the perspective from direct coercion to regulation"(Darmon, 1999: 5). 
From that perspective, normativity with regard to the parental role is far 
from being a new question; indeed it is deeply buried in the history of our 
contemporary societies. We could even trace it as far back as Jean-
Jacques Rousseau's famous treatise on education, Emile or On Education, 
                                                          
6
 . See http://www.pasde0deconduite.org/appel/  
7
 "An important consequence of the development of biopower is the growing space occupied by the norm set 
at the expense of the law's legal system"(Foucault, 1976, p. 189). 
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first published in 1762. The terms of this reflection (which intensified 
during the 18th century) on the status of the child and the purpose of 
education not only laid down the bases for a distinction between 
instruction and education, but also for a new division of roles between 
family and state. Right from the outset, this normative production and this 
'advice' to parents on education came up against the barrier of the family 
institution itself, and above all, in fact, against paternal authority - with 
fathers, in many cultures, considered heads of the family and guarantors 
of compliance with the rules within their own small 'community'. Although 
Rousseau recommended advances in favour of public education, he did 
not call paternal authority into question. On the contrary, he contributed 
to re-legitimizing its power - including at the expense of mothers. Almost 
two hundred years were to pass before this power was removed in France 
(‘parental authority’ reform in 1970). 
The construction of the 'welfare state' (education, health and social) in the 
course of the 19th and 20th centuries has continued to modify relationships 
between the private and public domains, shifting this privacy barrier and 
intensifying this normative work (in particular for protecting children and 
mothers) (see Joseph and Fritsch, 1977; Donzelot, 1977; Castel, 1995; 
Commaille and Martin, 1998; Lenoir, 2003). In addition, in extending the 
scope of its action, the state has gradually relieved the family of several of 
its functions. Alongside this, it has however created the epicentre of what 
was gradually to become known as 'social', by developing responses to 
compensate for disabilities and support certain citizens experiencing 
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weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Mothers are in the front line here 
(especially those belonging to the working class) as special targets for 
recommendations and other measures aimed at control and management, 
from the 18th century to the present day, in particular through public 
health interventions (Boltanski, 1969 ; Gojard, 2010 ; Garcia, 2011). 
Indeed, the definition of the ‘job of parenting’ is an outdated notion that 
has been pursued over more than a century by a multitude of experts 
anxious to dispense advice and recommendations to parents 'in distress' – 
as well as by public decision-makers denouncing the risks to which 
parents from the 'dangerous classes' would expose children perceived as 
being 'in danger'. Yet haven't the very terms of this definition of the 
problem changed? 
Advice and recommendations aimed at parents have also, for more than a 
century now, represented a real market which relies in particular on the 
feeling shared by parents that their task is difficult, and that many 
obstacles block the path to their child's socialization and life. Many 
psychologists, paediatricians, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts - and more 
broadly all those who might be qualified alongside Robert Castel as 
"therapists for normal people", using "medical-psychological 
techniques"(Castel, 1973 and 1981) - operate within the niche of this 
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growing demand for expertise and advice to parents, devoting a more or 
less substantial share of their professional practice to it8.  
Most of the knowledge accumulated in the course of the 20th century in 
the field of psychology, paediatrics, child and adolescent psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis has thus been devoted to understanding, defining and 
directing this parental role in order to come up with the best possible 
conditions for the guidance and socialization of the child (see Neyrand, 
2000). These experts in the parental role are now at work in the multiple 
links of a sprawling and mediatized market - a phenomenon accurately 
spotted by Robert Castel as long ago as the late 1970s9. 
This is the reason why, to identify what has really changed in the last 25 
years, we suggest picking up on the socio-historic lineage of Isaac Joseph 
and Philippe Fritsch in Disciplines à domicile, L’édification de la famille 
(1977), Jacques Donzelot in La police des familles (1977), or Luc 
Boltanski's study of the rules of childrearing and household teaching in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries in Prime éducation et morale de classes 
(1969). These works (which were, in part, influenced by the work of 
Michel Foucault10) quickly took stock of the impressive observation project 
                                                          
8
 For example, we might mention certain very popular authors advising parents throughout the 20
th
 century, 
such as the behaviorist John Watson in the thirties, Benjamin Spock in the forties and fifties, Thomas Brazelton, 
Penelope Leach in the seventies or John Rosemond in the nineties. For a historical analysis of these experts and 
messages, see Ann Hulbert (2003). 
9
 "The discourse put out by fans of Family Planning or the 'Ecole des parents', spokespersons on radio shows 
specializing in family and conjugal advice, and by women's magazines and 'society' sections in magazines and 
weekly publications, places responsibility for the ultimate reality of the family squarely on its members' ability 
to intensify their relationships and use psychology to regulate them (Castel, 1981, p. 185). 
10
 We could add the work of Norbert Elias as a source of inspiration in this lineage of interactions between 
individuals and society (Elias, 1987). 
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represented by this interaction between the state, public authorities, social 
and healthcare professionals and the "entrepreneurs of family morality", 
on the one hand, and the familial sphere and its actors, on the other. 
If we quickly recap the main orientations of these works, we realize the 
proximity between these researches and the phenomenon we are 
currently looking at. To take into account his perspective in La police des 
familles, Donzelot for example insisted on his determination to decode the 
modern passage from a model in which families were subjected to 
coercion, to a far subtler mechanism comprising over-investment in the 
role of the family "by making it the pre-condition for each member's 
fulfilment" (1977/2005: 5), and also, in the eyes of many, the guilty party 
in the event of a failed socialization process: 
"To describe the reform movement that constituted the modern 
family, we have thought of it in the same way as the passage from 
‘government of families to government by the family’. Government 
of families: this is the family of the Ancien Régime, a political 
subject, capable of using its members as instruments, deciding upon 
their fate, accountable for the behaviour of their members before 
the royal power, yet likely in return to draw upon it to impose its 
order on recalcitrant members. Government by the family: this time, 
the family is no longer the policy subject in its own history. Rather, 
it becomes the object of a policy. Its members are no longer 
expected to make alliance strategies or manage affiliations, because 
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the family is now a means for each member to achieve their own 
fulfilment, each person being able to justify the deficit in their own 
fulfilment and blame it on the family, on condition that they have 
the support of a judge, social worker or therapist who will help them 
to identify the source of their difficulties in the failings of their family 
(past or present) and to free themselves in one way or another" 
(Donzelot, 1977/2005: 6). 
Isn’t this phenomenon completely analogous with regard to the parental 
role? Is it possible to establish a parallel between Donzelot and Furedi’s 
hypothesis on parental determinism? It is just as easy to connect the 
contemporary parenting support issue to the questioning developed by 
Isaac Joseph and Philippe Fritsch (1977), when explaining their project in 
'Disciplines à domicile', that is to say: 
"working out the lineage of the normalization of intra-familial 
relationships, and more specifically of educational relationships since 
the end of the 18th century. Our hypothesis is that this normalization 
owes less to the overall subordination of the family to the logic of 
state apparatus and its role in reproducing social relationships, than 
to the import to its field and in its practice of disparate disciplinary 
tactics that originated in school, prison and hospital environments or 
the field of social assistance " (p. 19)…, while stressing the role of 
incidents "allowing deviant behaviours to be dramatized, and thus 
portraying ‘repoussoir-figures’ around which the norms for living, 
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and educating, were set in place (p. 22). For these two writers, "if, 
in the 19th century, we shifted from being a society of law to become 
a society of norms, as Michel Foucault says, this has been via a 
series of these dramatized figures, the logic of which is laid bare by 
a body of specialists in the order of knowledge" (idem). 
The question is thus to understand the current way to extend and 
reconfigure this normative work and this tradition of analysis. In so doing, 
we could certainly focus more precisely on the novelty of this emerging 
policy towards parents’ practices and distinguish which part of this novelty 
is context-related and which part is directly linked to the interventions and 
practices. 
Discussion: what’s new under the spotlight? 
In conclusion, we propose to stress three key results. First, new policies 
and institutions are undeniably emerging in different countries during a 
single period (late 1990s – early 2000s), using a new and similar 
terminology, common arguments and issues, but also generating a new 
market in programmes and instruments. Second, this emergence is 
framed by pre-existing ideological and professional fights, political battles 
in the course of political change and campaigns, as we argued for the 
French case. And third, the turn to parenting is also rooted in a long 
tradition which probably varies according to countries, but which is 
reactivated along the process by multiple come-backs and old ghosts.  
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Because of this ideological battle, observable change over the past two 
decades is structured by very classic oppositions, most of which are 
implicit. This is clearly the case in France, where normative work and 
institutions around family issues are particularly active. We therefore 
suggest a line of analysis referring to some national specificities that may 
have to do with a particular political party system shared by many 
southern European countries.  
A common “parenting culture”?  
In UK, the current parenting support policy is analysed as a new trend 
concomitant to or initiated by the Third Way. Following different authors - 
in particular Frank Furedi - Ellie Lee, Jennie Bristow, Charlotte Faircloth 
and Jan Macvarish recognize that a ‘parenting culture’ has been 
developing for a long time, and that its “basis lies in the working through 
of the separation out of ‘the family’ from the wider economy and society” 
(Lee, 2014: 7). Yet the novelty now refers to the “explicit focus on the 
parent and their behaviour” (op. cit.: 9), as well as on “parental 
determinism” and the necessity of targeting the “parenting practices of 
those who claim welfare benefits” (idem): parenting as a social problem, 
in short.  
“We can be sure that ‘parenting’ is not a neutral term to describe 
what parents do as they raise their children. Rather, the 
transformation of the noun ‘parent’ into the verb ‘parenting’ has 
taken place through a sociocultural process centring on the belief 
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that ‘parenting’ is a highly important and problematic sphere of 
social life; indeed, ‘parenting’ is almost always discussed as a social 
problem and in some way blamed for social ills” (Lee, 2014: 9). 
Val Gillies speaks of the rise of parenting driven by the 'Third Way'. This 
author promotes the view that a profound cultural change affecting the 
role of parent, due to a focusing of the attention of the public authorities 
on the act of 'parenting', gave rise to the idea of thinking of parenting as a 
competence likely to give rise to learning, leading to training actions, and 
necessitating a process of professionalization.  
"Parents have always been held responsible for the behaviour and 
development of their children but recent years have seen a cultural 
shift in the way childrearing is conceptualized and targeted by policy 
makers. In the past, intimate family relationships tended to be 
viewed as personal, private, and outside the remit of state 
intervention… Parenting is no longer accepted as merely an 
interpersonal bond characterized by love and care. Instead it has 
been re-framed as a job requiring particular skills and expertise 
which must be taught by formally qualified professionals."  (Gillies, 
2008: 95-96). 
Here is an initial difference between England and France. This idea of 
framing parenting as a job requiring skills and training employs precisely 
the terms used by a movement named l’école des parents, created in 
1930 (and still in existence today), whose objective was, at the very 
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beginning: "to teach parents to educate and instruct one another so that 
their children become future social and moral values" (quotation in 
Donzelot, 1979: 181). This movement (largely inspired by Catholicism and 
psychanalysts) had a precise historical context: defending family and 
parents against intrusion by the state and its agents (teachers and public 
health professionals) in private matters.  
As one of the European countries in which family has been considered an 
affaire d’Etat since the very beginning of the 20th century, France thus has 
an important specificity, namely the struggle between two forms of 
familialism: state familialism versus Church familialism (Lenoir, 2003). 
The current parenting support policy provides a perfect battlefield on 
which to expend these arguments, opposing Republican and religious 
positions. 
For the moment, as a high-ranking civil servant we interviewed in the 
PolChi project stated, the republican argumentation is still clearly 
dominant, even when it takes into account the fact that some citizens 
have more needs and demands than others: But this radical movement: 
“We remain faithful to the ideal of republican universality, but we 
are careful to ensure we support more people having higher needs, 
in a sort of proportioned universalism” (High-ranking civil servant, 
author of an official report on parenting support, Polchi interview). 
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Republican Universalism vs. Catholic Conservatism 
France offers many historic examples of this structural opposition between 
the Catholic Church and the République. One of the latest expressions of 
this tension was La manif pour tous, a social movement, which contested 
both the adoption of mariage pour tous (same sex marriage), and the 
socialist government’s initiative aimed at raising children's awareness of 
gender equality issues at school (l’ABCD de l’égalité).11 This conservative 
movement condemns a hypothetical ‘gender theory’ at the same time as it 
defends ‘natural’ sex differences and the necessity of distinguishing 
between mother and father. They only have a problem with an 
(apparently gender neutral) parenting policy where they believe it leaves 
the door open to gender confusion. 
To understand this drastic opposition, it is useful to recall the crucial 
arguments concerning political conflicts and coalitions and their specific 
combination in many southern European countries, linked to the fight 
between the state and the Catholic Church, between a Republican elite 
and Catholic movements (Martin, 2015b). This opposition is absolutely 
central to understanding the configuration of the Welfare state in these 
countries, particularly where family issues are concerned. 
Following van Kersbergen’s work about Christian democracy and the link 
between religion and the welfare state (van Kersbergen, 1995), Kees van 
Kersbergen and Philip Manow (2009) paid special attention to the crucial 
                                                          
11
 See http://www.cndp.fr/ABCD-de-l-egalite/accueil.html. 
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role of the electoral and political party systems. They intend to explain the 
difference between Social Democrats and Christian Democrats when 
looking at the role of religion in the framing of western welfare states. 
They reveal two different coalitions in each configuration:  
“The Social Democratic generous welfare states, which we find in the 
Nordic countries, have been the result of a coalition between Social 
Democratic parties and parties of agrarian defence (red-green 
coalition). One important precondition for this coalition has been the 
absence of a strong religious cleavage in the Scandinavian countries. On 
Europe’s continent, in turn, we find welfare states that are the product 
of a coalition between Social and Christian Democracy (red-black 
coalition). This is due to the fact that the second cleavage represented 
in the party systems of continental Europe, besides the dominant left-
right or labor-capital cleavage, has been the religious cleavage, a 
cleavage inherited from the state-church conflicts in the wake of the 
national revolution in which Liberal states’ elites challenged the church 
in its former domains such as education or poor relief” (Van Kersbergen 
and Manow, 2009, 22). 
In a recent paper, Philip Manow goes further and argues:  
“The fundamental character of the political conflict reveals the 
explanatory limits of an argument based solely on socio-economic 
analysis. In these conflicts, religion becomes relevant, first in the 
explanation of the totalitarian episodes of the southern countries – since 
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religion renders coalitions between workers and peasants impossible 
and thereby fosters the fascist path. These totalitarian episodes are 
then, second, an important explanatory factor for the persistence of 
political polarization in the postwar period, inter alia manifested in the 
fragmentation of the left in their party systems” (Manow, 2015, 37).  
For this author, this combined religious/political factor is crucial in each 
mono-confessional southern country, since it at once explains the 
radicalization to both right and left of the political arena: reactionary and 
anti-republican Catholicism since the 19th century, the rift between a 
reformist and a radical left wing and the violent clash between radical 
secularism and radical religiosity, between a clerical right and an 
anticlerical left.  
“The split between communist and social-democratic parties in the 
countries of southern Europe (Italy, Spain and Portugal, but also 
France)… is closely related to the decidedly anti-republican position held 
by the Catholic church in the mono-denominational Catholic countries of 
Europe’s South, since the deep divide between a sharp anticlerical labor 
movement and pious farmers under close tutelage of the church left the 
political left without allies for a reformist strategy” (Manow, 2015, 33).  
These religious and political factors offer a much better explanation than 
do the economic factors: the differences between Nordic, continental and 
southern countries, all of them concerned by late industrialization. Where 
a political alliance was possible between smallholding farmers and workers 
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in the (protestant) northern countries, it was clearly rejected, “due to 
non-economic reasons” (Manow, 2015, 40) in the Catholic south, marked 
by the violence of the confrontation between pious rural classes and the 
Marxist workers’ movement.  
These conflicting ideologies are undoubtedly still at work in the framing of 
parenting support policy and in France, they take the form of contrasting 
options: supporting (rather than controlling or condemning) families, and 
choosing universalist and egalitarian (rather than targeted and punitive) 
measures. 
A turn brought about by a new inter-generational challenge  
Though the processes of constructing a parenting issue do resemble one 
another from here to there and from then to now in Europe – for instance,  
in the act of backing measures and policy with arguments and 'scientific 
proof', or the use of a universal purpose to cover a targeted approach and 
differentiated social treatment - in short of euphemistically addressing the 
question of social class and inequalities - it does seem that the context in 
which this construction is produced also has its specificities, because of 
the changes that have occurred in terms of both familial practice and 
lifestyles, on the one hand, and the state's ability to intervene to guide 
these transformations, on the other (Martin, 2012b).  
We can thus, for example, ask how today's parenting support might allow 
us to update Robert Castel's diagnosis (1981) in terms of the 
management of risk. Back in the late 1970s, Castel had observed (by 
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using the psychological 'human potential intensification' techniques that 
were typical of humanist psychology of the 1970s and 1980s) that it was 
no longer a matter of "healing a disease, fixing a dysfunction or 
remedying a deficiency, but rather of working on each individual's 
personal and relational capital in order to intensify and improve its 
performance" (Castel, 2011: 11). In this way, Castel identified "a 
reorganization of social policy and interventions by the social state (‘the 
active social state’) in the sense of activation of the individual" (Castel, 
2011: 12). Today, it seems we have moved on to an additional stage – 
one  in which the problem is no longer just the production of the working 
adult via their psychological optimization, but rather that of focusing 
attention on the role played by those very adults that have become 
parents in their socialization function - within a context in which the levers 
of social advancement are in total collapse. 
In this sense, it could be argued that parenting support serves to 
complete personal development (even standing in for it, to some extent) 
since demand has moved so far from the ambient hedonism and 
individualism of the post-May 68 generation and towards the uncertainties 
of the present time, particularly with regard to the future of new 
generations (Castel, 2009). From adult-centred to child-centred policy, in 
a way. The contemporary focus on the parenting issue focuses on fresh 
priorities because of the rising pertinence of the question of children's' 
rights and public powerlessness in the face of the difficulties encountered 
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by new generations - children, adolescents and young adults - which in 
turn echo the supposed threats posed by antisocial behaviour.   
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